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ABSTRACT 
This article points out the aim and purpose of the competition law in the 
European Union. Competition law is one of the most crucial and 
essential part of law that has to be implemented properly to support and 
ensure smooth functioning of the economy in the state. At the same time, 
brief explanation of the most anticompetitive agreements such as called 
“Cartel Agreements” are being described in the article. It is worth to 
point out the most important and restrictive types of agreements in 
details that can be seen on the market and within the European Union, 
that definitely needs special attention by the relevant competition 
authorities of the Member States. 
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Introduction. Competition is a one of the most important and fundamental mechanisms of the 
economy, which is considered to be an essential factor for economic growth and prosperity. The 
primary goal of competition law is to remedy some of the situations in which the free market system 
collapse, simultaneously it has to ensure effectiveness of competition, prohibit any kind of agreements 
restricting free trade or competition between companies. It helps consumers get a good price and 
encourages firms to innovate by reducing slack; putting downward pressure on costs, it is a central 
driver for a productivity growth in the economy. Article 101 (81EC) of the treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union prohibits cartels and other agreements that could disrupt free competition and sets 
it out in following terms: “All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market, and in particular those, which directly or indirectly fix prices, limit or control production, 
share markets or sources supply”1. One of the most contentious and important aspects of competition 
law and policy in Europe and even beyond in recent years has been the regulation of what are now 
described as cartel violations2. Nowadays cartel agreements are becoming more and more problematic 
and breaking up this kind of unlawful agreement is a crucial part of the competition policy in most 
countries. Cartel is an explicit agreement among group of legally and economically independent 
companies or firms to fix prices limit supply, cooperation and competition, to restrict output and to 
raise prices of the product in order to make a profit3. Adam Smith had quoted that “people of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
 
1 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.101(81 EC) 
2 Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, (Second edition,2010) 1 
3 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, (University edn, Thomson Reuters 
Limited, 2010) 163 
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conspiracy against the public, or some contrivance to raise prices.”1 In general, cartels are not 
economically stable and don’t last for a long time, as the studies have discovered that the mean 
duration of cartels is from 5 to 8 years.  
Types of Cartel Agreements. There are various types of cartel agreements to which 
competition can be restricted through: 1) price-fixing; 2) Market Sharing; 3) Collective Boycotts; 
4) Exchange of Information; 5) Bid Rigging2; Price-fixing is an illegal agreement between companies 
in order to maximum or minimum prices to sell or buy goods. Mostly it leads to high prices to gain 
profits. This benefits all businesses or individuals that are on the same side of the market, but 
companies also try to fix the common target price that can be advantageous for them. There have been 
a lot of cases concerning price fixing between companies, but firstly only one case will be pointed out 
in order to have an idea how price fixing occurs between different firms. In 2007 The European 
Commission imposed a fine to Heineken Company (€219.3m), Grolsch (€31.65m) and Bavaria 
(€22.85m) for creating a cartel agreement on price fixing. These companies controlled 95% of the 
Dutch market and tried to carve up markets among themselves. Companies tried to fix prices, remain 
high positions in market restricting competition and were fined for such collusion3.  
Market Sharing is agreement between companies by which competitors divide up a market, 
customers, territories or the products and agree not to enter each other’s territory. Market Sharing 
agreements are particularly restrictive of competition and contrary to the benefit of single market. 
Agreements for the purpose of market-sharing are generally based on the principle of mutual respect 
of the national markets of each member state for the benefit of producers resident there.4 The case 
between SAS/Maersk gives an idea of market sharing agreement. The market sharing agreement was 
from 1998 to 2001, the companies agreed on the monopolization by SAS of the Copenhagen-
Stockholm route, harming more than million passengers. The illegal activity included SAS paying 
money to Maersk Company in order to get the specific route. Commission imposed fines of €52.5 
million for market sharing in the air transport sector.5  
Collective Boycotts is considered to be one of the most damaging, corruptive violations of 
competition law. It includes refusal by a group of competitors to deal with one or more customers or 
suppliers which is not part of “them”6. Collective boycott might also include refusal to supply some 
customers in order to make Competitor Company adopt a certain course of conduct. Such practices 
violate competition policy and breaches article 81(1). These kinds of cartel agreement cases are few, 
but one of the most famous cases is about Netherlands insurance company, which tried to prohibit its 
members from concluding re-insurance contracts with non-members. This type of action was 
considered as restriction of competition and Commission asked the association to change the rule. 
Exchange of information between companies regarding on production, prices charged, 
capacity, confidential information concerning the identity and solvency of costumers and conditions 
applied to them may exist and take place within cartels, which does prohibit article 81 of EC7. It does 
play role of ancillary to other per se violations such as price fixing or market sharing. It can be divided 
in two categories: 1) exchanging information that support collusive practices such as price fixing; 
2) Exchanging information that are not coupled with other collusive behavior, which will still infringe 
Article 81 (1), if it restricts the competition8. The debate on the exchange of the information between 
competitors under EC competition law is still one of the most controversial of the last years. The 
leading case on the exchange of information remains UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange 
case, where eight manufacturers and importers of tractors exchanged information identifying volume 
of retail sales and market shares9. Commission concluded that a detailed exchange of sensitive 
information in a market, which is not exposed to other competitors, increases the likelihood of 
collusive outcomes on the market and infringes Article 81 of EC. 
 
1 Cartels, Jeffrey M. Perloff, cartels: bad and ubiquitous, P.1 
2 Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Union, (Fifth Edition, 2005) 344 
3 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Bavaria v European Commission, OJ 2011, C226/23 
4 Commission’s 1st Report on Competition Policy (Commission, 1971), para.2. 
5 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law, (Fourth Edition, 2011) 812  
6 Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, (Fifth Edition, 2005) 378 
7 Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, (Second Edition, 2007) 772 
8 Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, (Fifth Edition, 2005) 382 
9 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, OJ 1992 L68/19 
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Bid Rigging occurs when companies collude on the bids and decides beforehand who should 
win the tender; instead of participate in real competition. Bid rigging almost always results in 
restricting competition, harming economy and is considered as violation of Competition law. There 
are different types of bid rigging practices: 1) Cover bidding; 2) Bid suppression; 3) Bid rotation; 
4) Market allocation1.  
Obviously cartel agreements are becoming one of the biggest problems of competition policy and 
it is important to concentrate more on price fixing and market sharing agreements afterwards and illustrate 
how it is becoming problematic and the most common ways to restrict and violate competition. 
The two most common types of cartel agreements. The most obvious type of price-fixing is 
between companies when they fix sale prices and increase profits.2. One of the biggest price fixing 
agreements could be seen in the case of Elevators and Escalators, where infringements were 
committed in one, several or All of the MS concerned (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands).3 Parties agreed to fix prices, agreed not to compete with each other and exchanged 
confidential information as well. As we see this is the case involving different types of illegal 
agreements that’s why Commission imposed fine of 990 million euros on four groups of companies 
for infringing Article 81 (1) of the EC treaty by creating cartels for the installation and maintenance of 
elevators and escalators. In the case of Cartonboard4, where one of the biggest fine was given to 
majority producers of Cartonboard made up a scheme, which involved not only price fixing, but 
market sharing, exchanging information and limiting production as well. They tried to benefit by 
managing price comparing to other Member State and increasing number of customers, leaving them 
without other alternative sources. This agreement did not harm only customers but trade between 
Member States as well. Commission fined 19 Undertakings for planning and implementing price 
increases, as they agreed on regular price, sharing market, planning to restrict competition as setting 
up common industry plan and exchanging commercial information. 
Agreements to implement price increases can be seen in the case of Rubber Chemicals, where 
3 major producer Flexsys, Bayer, Chemtura and five significant rubber smaller companies agreed to 
raise price for specific rubber chemicals from 1996 to 20015. They were implementing price increases 
and its amount focusing on customers’ reaction and exchanging on the positions regarding price 
negotiations with the customers. Investigation started after Flexsys was granted immunity in 2002. 
Undertakings were fined because of infringing Article 81 (1) of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement, but Commission took into account gravity, its impact on market and duration.  
Fixing purchase prices normally infringe Article 81 (1) EC too, because it does restrict the 
ability of the parties to purchase individually at different prices. In the case of Italian Raw Tobacco 
and Raw Tobacco Spain6, raw tobacco processors agreed at purchase price, which should be paid to 
tobacco growers in both countries, such way they managed to align as closely as possible their 
purchasing prices of tobacco and reduce them, to their own benefit. The commission emphasized that 
the ‘purchase price is a fundamental aspect of the competitive conduct of any undertaking operating in 
a processing business and is also, by definition, capable of affecting the behavior of the same 
companies in any other market in which they compete, including downstream markets’7. 
Discounts does play an essential role in price competition, as it entices people to go to special 
companies and get service or buy a specific product from them. Agreements fixing discounts are prohibited 
by Article 81 (1). In the case of FETTCSA 8(Far East Trade Tariff Charges and Surcharges Agreement) 15 
liner shipping companies agreed not to grant discounts. On the meeting held in 1992, parties agreed they 
would no longer grant discounts off the rates for ‘additionals’. Parties claimed that they did not mean to 
stop offering discounts but to stop charge ‘net all-in’ rates. In the decision Commission stated that an 
agreement not to grant discounts reduces the ability of lines to compete with regard to final price charged to 
shippers, it does affect overall price and all this amounts to a restriction of price competition. Commission 
 
1 OECD Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, p.2 
2 John M. Connor, Global Price Fixing, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, USA, 2001) 21 
3 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Elevators and Escalators, OJ 2008 C75/19 
4 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Cartonboard, OJ 1994 L 243/1 
5 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Rubber Chemicals, OJ L353/50 
6 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Raw Tobacco Italy, OJ 2006 L353/45 
7 Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, (Fifth Edition, 2005) 355 
8 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case FETTCSA, OJ 2000 L 268/1 
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decided that Undertakings agreed such provision constituted an infringement of the Article 81 (1) of the EC 
Treaty and fined fifteen liner shipping company. 
Resale price maintenance is dealt with within the framework of Article 81 (1) EC, because it 
generally concerns multilateral behavior by undertakings. An agreement between companies concerning a 
common resale policy is also chastened by the Commission. In Case VBBB/VBVB, decision has met a lot 
of criticism because many MS supported the use of RPM in the market. Two associations had agreed that 
books could not be sold in Belgium or the Netherlands at a price below fixed price set by the publishers. 
Parties claimed that RPM scheme was done in order to improve production and distribution of goods, but 
Commission considered that “any objective advantages which might derive from the agreement are 
outweighed by its disadvantages from the viewpoint of competition”.1Parties also claimed that RPM 
scheme did not eliminate competition as not all publishers took part in the collective system, but 
Commission found this agreement to infringe Article 81. 
Delivery charges do play an indispensable role calculating price of product and is an important 
key element of price competition. Agreements on unfair delivery charges constitute infringement of 
Competition law. In the case of Glass Containers, a system of delivery set up by undertakings was 
condemned by the Commission. The manufacturers of glass containers adopted free delivery system in 
June 1966, stating that ‘The free delivered price is the price of the goods plus average transport costs. 
This system makes it easier to sell products2’…. This system of delivery charges free applied by the 
parties to the exclusion of any other price system consists in applying, within a determined area and it 
does not reflect actual cost of transports of goods from place of origin to destination. It cuts any 
competitive advantage to other glass container, which can make profits from the proximity to his 
costumers. It does make only distant costumer in better position as the nearer customer pays higher 
price. System did not treat all customers in the same way and violated competition between 
undertakings and the users of glass containers. Commission found 24 undertakings constituting 
infringements of the provisions of Competition law. 
A market sharing agreement in its various forms, which has increasingly attracted the attention 
of the competition policy, is prohibited by the Article 81. In a market-sharing agreement competitors 
divide up markets in different ways, such as geographical area, size or type of customer and agree to 
sell only to their allotted segment of the market. As a result, they restrict competition and don’t even 
compete each other. It involves  non-price and quota agreements as well3. In the report Irish 
Competition Authority noted that an alternative to a price-fixing cartel, companies can achieve some 
effect by dividing up the country between and agree not to sell in each others designated area, which 
brings us to anticompetitive agreement such as market-sharing. In its fist report on commission policy 
the commission noted that ‘Market sharing agreements are restrictive of competition and contrary to 
the achievement of a single market.”4 Common types of Market-Sharing are: 1) geographical market-
sharing; 2) allocation of customers or products; 3) limitation of products or sources of supply; 
Geographical market sharing does obviate the cartel members to monitor, agree and enforce 
prices collectively, instead of limit their presence to a specific territory. Sometimes this type of market 
sharing agreement might be used by countries in order to protect their home markets as well. In the 
case of E.ON/GDF5, the commission imposed fines totaling 1.106 billion euros on E.ON AG 
(German) and its subsidiary E.ON Ruhrges and GDF Suez SA (France) for market-sharing in breach 
of the rules on cartels and restrictive business practices, Article 101 of the TFEU. After deciding to 
build jointly the MEGAL pipeline across Germany to import Russian gas into France and Germany, 
Companies agreed not to sell gas on each other’s home markets. They maintained this market-sharing 
agreement even after European gas markets were liberalized and did not abandon it at least until 2005. 
The main subject matter of the commission decision was the agreement for concerted practice not to 
enter each others market. Introducing with the first gas Directive6, companies still met regularly and 
discussed implementation of the agreement. This anticompetitive agreement helped companies to 
 
1 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case VBBB/VBVB, OJ 1982 L54/36 
2 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case Glass Containers, OJ 1974 L160/1 
3 S.P.S Chauhan, Microeconomics, (Part II, 2009)97 
4 Ivo Van Bael, Jean-Francois Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, (Third Edition, 2005) 812 
5 Eur-lex.europa.eu, official journal, case E. ON/GDF, OJ 2009, C248/5 
6 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas 
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maintain strong positions on gas markets. Having such kind of agreement, the commission found that 
parties conduct continued infringement and restriction of competition by violating Article 81. The 
commission denied parties claims on the basis that both companies were perfectly aware that they 
were infringing competition law and could not invoke any uncertainty. Determining final amount of 
the fine, the commission took into consideration nature of the infringement, the combined market 
share and the geographical scope as well and it totally reached to EUR 1.106 billion as case reflected 
the very large size of the market affected by the agreement and duration of it. 
Article 81 (1) (b) EC expressly prohibits any kind of agreements that limit or control 
production, markets or investment. Since the price of a product is a function of output and demand, a 
restriction in output by producers will affect prices. It is not surprising that parties also agree to limit 
production in order to support their price objectives. This kind of agreement allocating production 
quotas among competitor firms has been condemned by the community.1Market sharing can also take 
the form of customer specific measures. This may consist of allocating them and dividing them 
between companies. Mostly competitors try to agree to keep their own customers, constituent 
infringement of Article 81 of EC. In the case of Flood Flavour Enhancers2, there was an agreement 
outlining customer allocation between four undertakings. Participants in cartel agreement not only 
allocated the customers, but they also fixed prices and implemented price increases as well. Procedure 
against anticompetitive agreement started on 9 September 1999, when Japanese company Takeda filed 
an application pursuant to the commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel 
case by informing the commission about existing cartel. Members met and discussed general trends on 
the nucleotides market, share information on prices and discussed allocation between the 
manufacturers. During 1990 the European market was largely made up of three large industrial users, 
which together accounted around 50% of nucleotide demand in Europe. In this case, agreement 
involved customer allocation, as Takeda and Ajinomoto agreed not to sell to each other’s respective 
European customers, in order to protect their sales. They also had an agreement with Korean 
competitors to buy nucleotides from them, in exchange of Korean firms would not sell product to the 
European “big three.” As we see customer allocation scheme lead to the allocation of markets on a 
worldwide and restricted their individual commercial conduct. This agreement had the object and 
effect of restricting competition in the community, infringing Article 81 of EC. As competition law 
also prohibits control of investment, in the case of French beer3, which concerns the sales of beer in 
France in trade sector, was so called “armistice” agreement, with the aim of establishing equilibrium 
in the market between 2 companies. They wanted to control acquisition of wholesalers, balance 
distribution and agreed to a temporary acquisition stop, balancing volume of beer distributed through 
the network of each party and balancing of the volume of beer brands. As the aim of agreement was to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition within market by having anticompetitive actions, the 
commission concluded that it was infringing Article 81 of EC. As cartels are becoming problematic, 
that’s why it should be more interesting to talk about on new settlement procedure, introduced by the 
commission in order to fight against them by saving up time during investigation and making cartel 
members to collaborate getting 10% reduction of final fines. It is a new tool for cutting up cartel 
agreements and trying to eradicate such kind of anticompetitive agreements between companies. 
Conclusions. Cartel Agreements are one of the most restrictive agreements for the market and 
the competition. Anticompetitive agreements play an enormous role in distorting and restricting the 
free competition on the market. It is obvious that competition authorities of the member states or any 
state should fight against such restrictive agreements to support economic growth of the country and 
further development. 
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